He presented himself as Liu Jiubao and claimed to have been a Chinese army paratrooper. He was one of the first to post videos on social media claiming to be on the frontline in Ukraine embedded as a mercenary with Russian troops. He always recorded himself, dressed in military uniform, inside a shed that was practically dark. In each of his posts, he added a link leading to a cryptocurrency page. It was a scam. This guy was neither fighting in a war nor named Liu. When the deception was uncovered, the police revealed that the person behind this profile was a 20-year-old from southern China who was part of a network of crypto scams.
Since Vladimir Putin launched a large-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, several Chinese fighters claiming to be on the frontline have appeared on various Chinese platforms. Behind some of these profiles, fueled by a Chinese nationalist fervor that unconditionally supported Putin in the early months of the war, were scams like cryptocurrency schemes. Other alleged mercenaries seemed more real, but their stories were never verified. Chinese state media have not reported any news on this matter, unlike the press in other Asian countries such as India or Nepal, which have reported numerous mercenaries supporting the Russian army.
This week, amid the global chaos caused by Donald Trump's trade war, the case of Chinese mercenaries in Ukraine has also captured media attention after Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky unexpectedly revealed that his country's forces had captured two Chinese citizens fighting with Russian troops in Donetsk.
Later, Zelensky specified that he had the names and passports of over 150 Chinese mercenaries recruited by Moscow through social networks. The Ukrainian leader cast doubt, without directly accusing, that this had happened without China's knowledge, as China has maintained a very close relationship with Putin over the years.
Would Beijing really have given the green light for mercenaries from their country to fight alongside the Russians?
Initially, a regular spokesperson for the Chinese government said that Zelensky's words were "unfounded," but that Beijing would try to verify the information. A day later, as the issue heated up with Washington spokespeople recalling the alliance between Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping, the Asian superpower hardened its tone and warned Zelensky not to make "irresponsible comments."
The discussion about the mercenaries has even reached a session of the UN Security Council, where the Chinese representative, Geng Shuang, defended that his country's position on Ukraine has always been to promote peace talks. However, from Washington, where they also do not hide their close ties to Moscow to mediate in ceasefire negotiations, they do not see that alleged mediator role that China claims to play very clearly.
"China is a significant enabler for Russia in the war in Ukraine," said State Department spokesperson Tammy Bruce, citing Beijing's supply of what Washington considers dual-use items that Moscow needs to sustain its attack. This week, the head of the US Indo-Pacific Command, Admiral Samuel Paparo, testified before the Senate that China had provided 70% of the tools and 90% of the chips that Russia is using to "rebuild its war machinery." In return, Paparo claimed, Beijing would be receiving Russian technological assistance for military purposes, such as making their submarines move more quietly.
The current picture of the new multipolar order is as follows: Putin (72 years old) and Xi (71 years old) reiterate that they maintain what they themselves have dubbed an "unlimited strategic partnership," while the Russian and Trump (78 years old) continue to strengthen ties and negotiate with their teams over the future of Ukraine over the weekend, sidelining other relevant actors such as Kiev or the European Union. Another new rapprochement that coincides with the exchange of tariff blows between Washington and Beijing, whose rise increasingly threatens US hegemony, with a president determined to break the entire rules-based international order that emerged at the end of World War II.
In this three-way game, the only thing that seems clear is that Beijing and Moscow are rowing in the same authoritarian direction, albeit with the Kremlin as a minor trading partner in a very unequal relationship. Putin depends much more on Xi than vice versa, and this is what some analysts from US think tanks hold onto to assert that one of Trump's strategies is to distance Russia from China.
In an interview conducted shortly before the US elections in November, Trump argued that the United States, under Joe Biden's leadership, was responsible for fostering relations between China and Russia. "Separating the two nuclear powers would be a priority of his Administration. I will have to separate them, and I think I can do it," Trump declared. A month ago, after his call with Putin, the US president reiterated the same in another interview on Fox News. "As a student of history, the first thing you learn is that you never want Russia and China to unite," he said, referring to a strategy followed by former President Richard Nixon to approach China as a counterbalance to the Soviet Union.
However, the prevailing opinion among international analysts is that, in a context so different from the Cold War, it is highly unlikely that Trump can break the close relationship between Russians and Chinese. Even if he tried to create a rift between the two neighbors due to the long land border they share, where occasional disputes arise. Putin and Xi share several strategically important goals, starting with precisely undermining US dominance on the global stage.
Since the invasion of Ukraine, Moscow and Beijing have strengthened their partnership, and China's economic support has been the Kremlin's main card to navigate the impact of Western sanctions. In 2024, bilateral trade reached a record $237 billion, and Russia now heavily relies on China as a key buyer of oil and gas.
European leaders have repeatedly urged Xi Jinping to use his influence over Putin and pressure his Russian partner to halt the attack. The Asian country, at least outwardly, has insisted on maintaining a neutral position. However, internally, state propaganda channels have been sharing the Kremlin's narrative for years.
The most significant effort Beijing has made (which still refers to the invasion in official speeches as the "Ukraine crisis") when trying to present itself as a mediator was the publication of a document with 12 points that, rather than a solid proposal to resolve the conflict, reflected China's official stance on respecting Ukraine's sovereignty and calling for a ceasefire, while also considering Russia's security concerns regarding the expansion of NATO into Eastern Europe.
In the over three years of war, Xi Jinping only called Zelensky once, while with Putin, in addition to numerous phone calls — the latest in February, coinciding with the anniversary of the conflict — the Russian leader has visited Beijing twice. Both continuously display signs of unity. Kremlin spokespersons have hinted that the Chinese leader may visit Moscow in May, which would be his second trip to the Russian capital in recent years.