Rafael Dezcallar (Palma, 1955) arrived in China in 2018, amidst the showdown between the Asian giant and the United States during Donald Trump's first trade war. He experienced a pandemic in Beijing under the yoke of draconian restrictions that lasted for three years and witnessed firsthand how, as a result of these prolonged closures, the well-oiled Chinese economic engine took time to restart. He left the country in 2024 and has wanted to unveil in a book his particular vision of the communist superpower, a vision that only an ambassador with 40 years of diplomatic career worldwide can have.
Dezcallar has been Spain's ambassador to Ethiopia, Germany, and China, among many other high-ranking positions in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Coming from an aristocratic background, brother of a former director of the CNI (National Intelligence Center), and author of several novels and children's stories, he has just published The Rise of China (Ediciones Deusto), a book in which he addresses the success of the open-door policies of the late 1970s to the current role of Xi Jinping's China, which presents itself as an alternative to U.S. hegemony in the global order.
Question. Is China filling the voids left by Trump's chaotic diplomacy?
Answer. The United States has been representing a set of shared values for 200 years, and these are not easily destroyed. So, in addition to the noise surrounding the Trump administration, we have to wait and see how things progress. China is the main trading partner of 120 countries and is expanding its influence, especially in developing countries. It has many aspirations to compete with the U.S. for global hegemony. But to truly act as a superpower, it has to roll up its sleeves and intervene, take risks in resolving international conflicts. And it is not doing that. Being a great power not only means having weapons, a strong economy, and influence. It also means assuming responsibilities. For example, with the attacks by the Houthis on commercial ships in the Red Sea, which are affecting trade between China and Europe. The Houthis are allies of Iran, a country closer to China, which has done nothing to stop this problem. Just as it has not taken action to help end the civil war in Sudan, which is happening in an area where Beijing has many interests, and has also failed to mediate in Gaza despite having managed to get Saudi Arabia and Iran to resume diplomatic relations in that region.
Q. In the war in Ukraine, Beijing has expressed its willingness to mediate with its partner Putin several times, but has not made any progress.
A. Many European countries have been trying since 2022 to explain to China how important it is for them to mediate in this conflict due to their ability to pressure Russia. Trump, at least, is trying to do something to end the war, while the Chinese have not done anything significant for a very simple reason: Beijing seeks to maintain a strong relationship with Russia because it gives them strategic depth in their dispute with the U.S. China is not interested in seeing Russia weakened by this war and will not do anything that weakens Putin in Ukraine.
Q. In recent weeks, there have been several signs of rapprochement between China and the European Union.
A. I agree with the EU's established policy towards Beijing: it is a strategic rival and also a necessary partner. We must defend ourselves against China when necessary and collaborate with it when possible. In terms of trade, we have to fight to be able to compete on equal terms. When I was ambassador in Beijing, I said that our goal was for Spanish companies to be able to do in China what Chinese companies do in Spain, for trade terms to be balanced. We must know when to stand up to China and when to engage in dialogue because its contribution is crucial on many global issues, such as climate change.
Q. President Pedro Sánchez arrived in Beijing yesterday for the third time in two years. Is the Spanish government seeking to build an alliance with China and be a bridge between Beijing and Brussels?
A. There is very good political communication between Spain and China. Spain can contribute to the most balanced possible relationship between the EU and China. But in Brussels, there is a consensus that the alliance with the U.S. has been generating stability and defense of a set of shared values for decades. Although there are different sensitivities in Europe regarding China, I don't think anyone is considering replacing the Washington alliance with one with Beijing.
Q. In your first book, published in 1992, you already addressed Europe's security dependence on the U.S.
A. By entrusting Europe's defense to the U.S., Europe has naturally lost a lot of independence, and now we understand that this cannot continue. Reducing this dependence is not an easy task and will not be achieved in the short term, but it is very necessary. Europe must take the reins of its own security, always in alliance with the U.S., but without dependence.
Q. If Trump forces a peace agreement in Ukraine favorable to Putin, could this be seen by Beijing as a pretext to launch an invasion of Taiwan?
A. I am convinced that the Chinese are making calculations in that regard. That is precisely why Europeans insist that the peace reached in Ukraine must have solid foundations. If Russia gains an advantage in the negotiations, globally it would give the impression that an aggressor ends up achieving good results.
Q. You have witnessed China's incredible development in record time in many fields, such as technology and science. How did they achieve this?
A. China ceased being a communist country long ago. It is capitalist in its economic model and Leninist in its political model. Managing this is very complicated because capitalism generates great economic independence among the main economic actors and goes against the tendencies of Leninism, which is absolute control of everything from the central government. Organizing this system is not easy, and if China has done it, it is because it has had a Communist Party (CCP) that has been able to control society and curb the drift of capitalism towards individual freedoms, and this can only be done in a totalitarian state that does not respect human rights.
Q. Despite all the limits on individual freedoms, the CCP continues to enjoy great popularity within the country.
A. Chinese political culture does not come from Greco-Latin or Enlightenment traditions but from Confucianism, which prioritizes community interests over individual rights. The Chinese have always been clear that the community comes before individual rights and freedoms. Economic progress has been key, and this is known by citizens who have lived in poverty. The CCP is a well-oiled power machine that has worked to control society, and its way of managing its totalitarianism is more sophisticated than in other regimes.
Q. Now, the country is going through significant economic turbulence. Could that desire for social stability be at risk if the new generations of Chinese start living worse than their parents?
A. The CCP is very aware of this factor. They know very well that a fundamental aspect of the social contract they have with citizens is that they govern with stability in exchange for prosperity. But if that prosperity were in question, there would be social discontent and many protests. On the other hand, another factor of stability is nationalism. The Chinese are very nationalistic, especially now that they are immersed in rivalry with the U.S. If prosperity were to decline, the party could resort to nationalism to indoctrinate the people around its policies.