"In 10 years, we will have the means to kill 80 million Russians. I truly believe that no one will lightly attack a people who have the capacity to kill 80 million Russians, even if they have the ability to kill 800 million French, in the case that there were 800 million French."
When on December 14, 1961, Charles de Gaulle uttered those words, the possibility of a nuclear war was part of daily reality in the world, especially in Europe. Four months and a day earlier, the Soviet Union had begun building the Berlin Wall to prevent citizens of East Germany from voting with their feet - the only way they could - and escaping en masse to the West. Ten months and two days later, the world was on the brink of a nuclear Holocaust due to the Cuban Missile Crisis, when the USSR placed atomic missiles just 160 kilometers from the United States.
Today, 52 years, two months, and 22 days after the start of the missile crisis, nuclear weapons are back in the spotlight in Europe. Now it is not the possibility of a nuclear war in Europe - the decisive front of the Cold War - between the Warsaw Pact and NATO, but the construction of a credible European deterrence system, at a time when Donald Trump has questioned the validity of the American nuclear umbrella that has protected countries on this side of the Atlantic since the end of World War II, exactly 80 years ago. In NATO's Strategic Concept approved during the Alliance's reinvention at the Madrid summit in 2022, nuclear weapons are the "supreme deterrent" element. Now, the provider of that deterrence under a quasi-monopoly, Washington, is closer to Moscow than to Brussels. And certainly closer than to Kiev.
The only candidate to replace the United States is France. But with many limitations. The fact that the French President, Emmanuel Macron, is considering extending the country's nuclear umbrella to other European nations that have shown interest in the idea, such as Germany, Denmark, and Poland (the latter two significantly close allies of the United States) raises more questions than it answers.
In reality, the European nuclear umbrella is nothing more than a project. A Euro-optimist would respond by saying that this is how the united Europe we know was built. A Euro-pessimist would argue that at this moment, the French nuclear deterrence - the only one that truly matters in this debate - is so small and has so many problems that, if it were an umbrella, it would be nothing more than the handle and the ribs, with perhaps a few pieces of fabric fluttering in the wind, unable to protect the Old Continent from a rain of missiles from Russia. Creating that umbrella will take at least a decade and cost at least hundreds of billions of euros, putting to the test the will of European governments and electorates accustomed to decades where wars were someone else's concern. The party is over. European pacifist exceptionalism rested on foundations of plutonium. And that plutonium is from the United States, not Europe.
Moscow has the outdated and ineffective - but massive - Soviet nuclear legacy: 1,710 atomic bombs ready to be used at this very moment plus another 3,870 in various states of storage. In contrast, France only has 290 bombs, with around 240 on submarines in M-51 missiles with a range of about 10,000 kilometers, and another 50 in ASMP cruise missiles with a range of about 300 kilometers, launched from Rafale fighter-bombers, the French competitor to the Eurofighter used by Spain and other European countries.
Furthermore, it is a less flexible force because, with only two types of bombs, France cannot play the escalation threat game. This is compounded by a technologically outdated C3 (command, control, and communications) system. Probably Russia is not in a better position. But it has the advantage of numbers: an immense territory, with a few cities - at least compared to Europe - and a formidable amount of weapons.
The leap that Emmanuel Macron is proposing by discussing extending French nuclear protection to its allies - currently Germany and likely Denmark and Poland - is enormous in terms of doctrine - as it includes the protection of third countries and a direct and expansionist enemy, Russia - and capabilities.
And inevitably, money comes into play. The United States spends around 70 billion euros annually on its nuclear arsenal. France, about 5.5 billion. But it cannot afford more. In fact, Paris has been trying for years to transfer part of its nuclear energy policy to the EU, hoping to pool the costs of its nuclear program through the back door, which would still remain under French sovereignty.
Unlike the United Kingdom, France has taken obsessive care of maintaining its Defense industry. This has allowed, for example, the donation of Mirage 2000 fighter-bombers to Ukraine without having to seek permission from the United States, in stark contrast to other NATO members who had to wait months for Biden's government to give the green light for the transfer of F-16s to Kiev.
But the price paid has been very high, focusing on logistics and maintenance. Even during the Cold War, French nuclear weapons systems were reputed to be technically inferior to the British, which in practice are an extension of those of the United States. Now, the technological revolution has worsened matters. For the first time in four decades, the United States is developing a new land-based intercontinental missile, the LGM-39 Sentinel, which will be deployed in four years with a novel digital communications system that will be invulnerable (at least in theory) to the electromagnetic waves generated by a nuclear war. China has hypersonic missiles, and the United States is testing them.
Although Russia does not have any of that, neither does France. And technologically, it is unlikely that France will achieve it. The future French nuclear aircraft carrier - the PANG project, which is expected to enter service in 14 years - will carry planes capable of launching atomic bombs. But the launching and landing systems for these aircraft will be American. The fact that Paris believes that by 2038 it will not be able to develop technology that has been operational on the American aircraft carrier Gerald R. Ford since 2017 is another example of Europe's technological lag in Defense. Not to mention the issue of anti-aircraft defense, necessary if a country wants to protect itself from atomic missiles. Europeans have nothing comparable to the American Patriot systems, which have been around for almost four decades. Not to mention the Thaad, capable of shooting down missiles at 150 kilometers altitude.
The case of Great Britain is very different. The country has around 225 atomic bombs, with approximately 120 operational. But there, the problem is political: Washington effectively has veto power over the use of those devices and their launchers, which are partially designed, manufactured, and maintained by the United States.