A year ago, Vladimir Milov arrived in Brussels in a state of shock after the death under strange circumstances of Alexei Navalny in an Arctic prison. He had been an advisor to the Russian opposition leader and had previously collaborated with the also critic of the Putin regime, Boris Nemtsov, and neither of the two was alive anymore. The economist emotionally addressed the European Parliament's Committee on Foreign Affairs in memory of his friend. He advocated for their cause in that moment of painful orphanhood. And then he returned home. Of course, in exile. Of course, alongside his bodyguards.
Milov (Kemerovo, Russia, 52 years old) has just visited the European Parliament headquarters in Strasbourg to analyze the state of his country's economy and the measures that could be taken in the Baltic region to better control the Russian shadow fleet. The man who in the early 2000s served as Deputy Minister of Energy and advised Putin on the breakup of Gazprom is now one of the main critical voices against the Kremlin and maintains several online communication channels. However, he did not post his first message of the year on Instagram until yesterday, precisely regarding the flow of news related to the war in Ukraine. "I don't have time to comment on everything that's happening," half-jokingly admitted the vice president of the Free Russia Foundation.
Question. I imagine that during your recent visit, you had the opportunity to gauge the mood of the Members of the European Parliament regarding the peace negotiations between the US and Russia. How would you define it? Helplessness? Betrayal?
Answer. I am not sure if I am authorized to disclose the closed-door conversations held outside the chamber, but I would say that overall, I have not perceived a sense of betrayal. I have met with members of Parliament from different political groups, and what I have observed is a broad consensus on the need to continue supporting Ukraine. Many confess to being horrified by the shocking concessions announced by the Trump administration. It is not what they expected from the US as an ally. It may take some time for Europe to realize how it needs to respond because clearly, significant commitments and resources are needed to fill the void left by the US. This is where it gets delicate. Europe has to find resources to achieve this because the West has relied too much on the US. I had some conversations about this, but the formula still poses an unanswered question. There is a high degree of uncertainty. I have also heard widespread condemnation of the concessions to Putin announced by the Trump administration. All eyes are on the executive power, on what the response will be from the European Council and the European Commission.
Q. Russia has managed to engage in peace talks directly with the United States and relegate Ukraine to a secondary role. What can be expected from these talks that leave the invaded country and the rest of Europe out of the negotiating table?
A. We are talking about something worse than the Yalta model. We are talking about the Munich model, and as you know, its consequences were much more catastrophic. The US has the power to cut military assistance or any other assistance to Ukraine. But it cannot dictate what Ukraine should do, whether it should continue to fight against Russian aggression or not. Nor can it impose its criteria on other countries. Ukraine could find other allies willing to replace American aid, perhaps not entirely, but at least partially.
Q. Do you subscribe to the criticisms of Trump for his policy of appeasement?
A. If we listen carefully to what the president is saying, his Secretary of Defense, Pete Hegseth, and his Secretary of State, Marco Rubio, we will realize that they are repeating exactly the words of British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain to justify his agreement with Hitler in 1938. It is a precise repetition of Chamberlain's arguments against the defense of Czechoslovakia. If we were to use an AI-based language model, it would be quite evident that Trump is using 100% of Chamberlain's arguments.
Q. The two-way dialogue between the US and Russia, blessed by China, does it show that the world is moving towards an unstoppable neo-imperialist era?
A. Indeed, there is a significant shift in that direction. Putin and his circle of advisors have been promoting their ideal vision of the world for years. They mention the concert of nations of the 19th century as an alternative to democratic rules or global borders established after the end of the Cold War. Vyacheslav Nikonov is one of the key leaders of the United Russia party in the Nizhny Novgorod region's government. He is also the grandson of Molotov, who signed the infamous pact with Ribbentrop in 1939. Nikonov has written a series of articles for the magazine Russia in Global Affairs called Back to the Concert, in which he specifically refers to the 19th-century concert of nations. Basically, it portrays a handful of powers dividing the world. That is the alternative Putin sees to the US global domination of the last decades: a group of dictators and their respective spheres of influence. With Trump's return to the White House, we are quickly returning to a world order that Humanity already knows and that ended quite badly, with two world wars in the first half of the 20th century. Whether we return to that world order largely depends on the citizens of the free world and how determined we are to confront it. We are not only talking about Ukraine, Europe, and other democratic countries, but also about Americans themselves and whether they will accept their leader suddenly taking that direction. In the US, there are many voices in favor of maintaining the democratic order based on rules. We will see if they are able to maintain significant resistance.
Q. Should the end of international isolation - at least by the West - of Putin have come at a higher price?
A. It is clear that Trump's intention is to forgive Putin for all the war crimes committed in Ukraine. But turning the page is absolutely unacceptable because it would become an incentive not only for Putin but for other aggressive strongmen. They would see that if they persist in pushing their agenda, they would be authorized to take territories or modify borders by force. It is a serious danger that we should not expose ourselves to. However, I insist, Trump's actions show that he does not trust the international rule of law. He only trusts transactions and personal agreements between strong leaders. That is the worldview dreamed of by Putin.
"Even without Navalny, the hope that Russia will become a democratic and peaceful country is still very much alive"
Q. If I am not mistaken, you currently reside in Vilnius. Are you concerned that Putin's validation of a position of strength could materialize as a threat to Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia in the medium term? The former Estonian Prime Minister Kaja Kallas, now head of European diplomacy, has always advocated for achieving peace through force precisely because she is aware of what the Kremlin's intentions may be. Are the Baltic countries and Poland less secure today than yesterday?
A. Indeed, I now live in Lithuania, and I am 100% sure that validating Putin's territorial conquest will push him further. It is not about my perception or the people of the Baltic States, Poland, or Finland. It is an intention expressed on several occasions. I am surprised that in the West, not much attention is paid to what Putin and his inner circle continue to publicly state for the Russian audience. They do not hide their intention to restore the borders of the former Russian Empire. They have even mentioned the intention to somehow restore Russian influence over Poland, Finland, or Romania. Not to mention the Baltic countries, which are relatively small and would only be partially protected in the event of a hypothetical invasion.
Q. The Russian economy is showing signs of approaching a critical point after three years focused on maintaining the war effort and with the military-industrial complex practically exhausted. Have the peace negotiations come at the most opportune moment for Moscow?
A. Yes, the abrupt shift in US policy by the Trump Administration makes all this even more unfortunate because it comes at a time when Russia's resources are running out. On various fronts: financial resources, capabilities of the military industry, workforce, etc. If it had occurred just a few months later, we would have found ourselves in a completely different situation on the front lines, with Russia's capabilities to launch any offensive diminished and in a questionable position to face the Ukrainian forces' counteroffensive, if it were to take place. We are seeing a small sample of this in the Kursk region, where the Russians have been unable to regain the positions taken by Ukraine after trying for several months. Kiev even launched a counteroffensive there recently. Russia's National Wealth Fund (NWF), which has served as a cushion, is almost empty. At the beginning of this month, there was less than $40 billion left, which is roughly equivalent to a year's budget deficit.
Q. So?
A. Russia needs to increase military spending in Ukraine, but it does not have the money to do so. It does not have the liquidity for another year of deficit. The government cannot borrow money because it is isolated in international financial markets. In theory, it can borrow internally, but not at the current interest rate, as with the high yields of government bonds, they are close to 17%. The government spends almost the same amount on paying interest rates as it receives from the market. In 2024, Russia's net debt was almost zero because it raised four trillion rubles but was forced to pay almost the same amount in debt and interest. The only option left is currency issuance, but financing the deficit with issuances would lead to higher inflation. Inflation, largely a product of international sanctions as well. The Russian Central Bank continues to inject huge amounts of money into the economy, supporting the military industry, compensating for the lack of imports... But production cannot keep up because it is restricted by the lack of access to capital, technology, etc. So yes, this is the moment when international sanctions begin to have a real impact. This makes Trump's actions even more regrettable. Putin would be in a much weaker negotiating position if we had waited just a few more months.
Q. Trump is interested in securing Ukraine's rare earths at all costs. Does applying a business mentality to geopolitics open the door to a future where economics prevails over any other criterion?
A. Yes. Again, this is a very unfortunate view by Trump because it subordinates the principles of international law in defending Ukraine to purely transactional matters. What if Ukraine did not have these resources? Then, according to Trump, it would be exposed to any neighboring dictator who wanted to seize its territory. Such a mindset illustrates a lack of basic knowledge about how these minerals, their production, and development work. Imagine that you supply rare earths to large tech companies. You would have many places to invest in worldwide: China, Indonesia, Madagascar, even Greenland...Which one would you choose? A place threatened by military action or another that has its security guaranteed? Surely, you would choose the second option. Ukraine is at a disadvantage in this regard. And I'll go further: if the US rejects Ukraine's incorporation into NATO and the security guarantees that membership entails, do you think anyone would decide to invest in a country with such a risk? This also shows that Trump has limited knowledge about how this industry operates. Without the necessary security guarantees, it is highly unlikely that Ukraine can become a significant producer of rare earth elements.
Q. The US President demands that its NATO allies contribute 5% of their GDP. What sacrifices would countries like Spain have to make to reach that quota?
A. Here I must say that I agree with Trump. With the military threat from dictatorial powers like Russia, China, and some countries in the Middle East, it is worth it for democratic countries to spend more on Defense. I do not necessarily consider it a burden or sacrifice. Let's look at Poland, for example. It is the country that spends the most on Defense of all NATO members, over 4% of its GDP. Poland is not in economic trouble, far from it. It enjoys the longest period of uninterrupted GDP growth in decades. It managed to maintain it even during the eurozone crisis and performed much better than most during the pandemic crisis. Additionally, there is a way to make the economy benefit from this investment: through the transfer of military technology to civilian sectors. In the specific case of Spain, it has fallen behind. It is below 2% of GDP, which does not correspond to the current volatile circumstances. Perhaps Spain is not in danger of being attacked, but there are allies that could be and would require significant assistance - even military - to maintain the rules-based international order from which Spain also benefits. Therefore, returning to my conversations in Strasbourg, I would say that there is a minimum consensus on this issue between Trump supporters and representatives of skeptical democratic countries regarding Trump's intentions.
Q. What remains today in Russia of Navalny's political vision?
A. Navalny triggered a very important shift in the Russian mentality. Before he emerged as a political leader, Russians who wished to live in a democratic, peaceful country integrated into the civilized world considered themselves a minority. They thought that Russia could never achieve it, that it would always be a kind of archaic autocratic empire. Navalny, with his 2018 presidential campaign and his subsequent popularity in Russian society, sparked in millions of Russians the hope that a different Russia was possible. I closely observed that transformation. It was a significant change in the thinking of millions of people, a sort of great awakening of the Russian nation. Several million Russians closely follow our broadcasts in exile. The figures handled by Navalny's team indicate that we have over 20 million regular viewers in Russia on our YouTube channels. It is a quite significant number of followers, especially considering that such broadcasts are prohibited. They are considered extremist content punishable by Russian law, but people continue to watch. This means that even a year after Navalny's death, the hope that Russia will become a democratic and peaceful country is still very much alive.