In the late 90s, Sami Naïr (Tlemcen, Algeria, 1946), who had held various advisory positions in France during the socialist government of Lionel Jospin, was elected as a Member of the European Parliament. In the Strasbourg Parliament, where he would remain until 2004, he began to be disillusioned with the European Union project. "At that time, I was very optimistic and saw the construction of Europe as our historical task. It was for me something that had to overcome nationalism, xenophobia, celebrate the meeting of the peoples of the continent, and above all, to establish a united entity where the southern countries, Spain, Greece, Portugal, and Italy, would join the northern ones to build a great economic and political pole," recalls the political scientist, who had just arrived in Paris after giving a lecture in Spain, where he is a regular at several universities.
However, his idealistic enthusiasm waned upon learning the real ins and outs of the corridors of Strasbourg, Brussels, and Frankfurt: "Especially following the failure of the Constitutional Treaty of 2004, I began to see things differently. I realized that there was actually no will to build a political Europe, a united Europe, but only an economic Europe that was from the beginning in the hands of economic and commercial forces for which other social, political, and humanitarian issues were completely secondary."
This feeling, as recounted by the French sociologist and professor of Algerian origin (born in that country, where his father was in the military, but raised in the French city of Belfort, in the east of the country), specializing in migratory movements, intensified in the following years. "When I saw the austerity policies implemented after the 2008 crisis, especially in the southern European countries, I knew it was going to be a disaster. I remember that in 2010, I participated in a talk in Murcia where I said that Spain was going to have millions of unemployed people because of that policy of social austericide, and that it was going to cost the European construction a lot," says the essayist, who already in 2014 published the revealing essay The European Disillusionment. "And we have seen it. We are still immersed in a tremendous crisis that has severely fractured all societies, especially those in southern Europe, which have not yet recovered."
A decade later, Naïr once again criticizes the deficits of the European project in Chained Europe (Galaxia Gutenberg), a pessimistic review of the Union's woes that focuses on the adoption of radical neoliberalism and criticizes the European Commission and its Central Bank for leading the Union to the detriment of a social and democratic Europe. "The rise of nationalist populism is a direct consequence of that neoliberal policy that Germany imposed with the support of France - that is, Mrs. Merkel and Mr. Sarkozy - and with the help of the governments of Austria and the Netherlands, on the rest of the European countries. There is still time to change course, but if we wait to act, it may be too late."
Question. Defend that exacerbated neoliberalism, the primacy of the economy over politics, is the origin of the great evils afflicting the European project today. When did this situation begin?
Answer. When the common European project was born after World War II, the United States was deeply involved in its construction and conditioned its economic orientation. According to their interests, they wanted a liberal Europe, but in those years, until the late 80s, European states still played a fundamental role, and most implemented public social policies. At that time, a mixed economy was advocated where a strong and dynamic private sector could thrive, while a public sector took care of the general interest, public services, which made populations identify with the European process. The radical change came with neoliberalism imposed by the Maastricht Treaty, which, following the trend of the time, decreed total capital liberalization starting in 1993.
Q. What shift did the policy adopted in Maastricht represent, and what are its consequences today?
A. Since 1993, the political and social development dimension of the European Union has been totally forgotten and this neoliberal orientation has been chosen. In practice, this meant the subordination of states to policies directed by the Brussels Commission and the European Central Bank, leading to a significant democratic deficit. These bodies have since controlled three key levers: deficit, inflation, and public debt. This, coupled with the disastrous creation of the euro, an overvalued currency not reflecting the economic reality, remains a burden in fostering continental unity.
Q. What was the "original sin" of the euro?
A. From the beginning, it was known that the single currency would lead to indebtedness for less developed countries like Spain, Portugal, Italy, Greece, even France, but there were no mechanisms to do it differently. If at the same time the single currency was created, a fiscal harmonization policy and control of the European Central Bank, a European economic government to jointly decide major orientations such as implementing social policies, for example, minimum social wages at the European level, it might have worked extraordinarily. But without a political authority, it couldn't be done. And so, we continue with a crisis in Europe, where only extremisms thrive, right or left, as a result of the breakdown of the European social bond, influenced by the disastrous economic management.
Q. In your book, you name many of those responsible for this situation...
A. There are several, yes, in many areas. This neoliberal project would never have succeeded without the alliance between the French social democracy and Germany, both Helmut Kohl's Christian Democrats and Gerhard Schröder's Social Democrats, but fundamentally, my country ideologically coined the concept of this neoliberal Europe. In the book, I detail how individuals like Jacques Delors at the Brussels Commission and other high-ranking officials leading the main international institutions at that time, both the Central Bank and the International Monetary Fund, lied in their data and analysis. Looking back, this has been the main cause of decline, the profound crisis in which the French Socialist Party still finds itself. They lost power due to that policy, and people like François Hollande, a president who changed absolutely nothing when he came to the Élysée in 2012. They are paying a high price for it. If in the 80s someone had told me that the National Front, now National Rally, would have 11 million votes, I wouldn't have believed it. And we can see how Chancellor Scholz is faring...
Q. Beyond criticism, 'Chained Europe' also offers urgent solutions. What is the main direction the European Union should take now? Is it possible to reverse course?
A. Of course, we are not condemned for eternity to accept this neoliberal model that destroys the social bond. We know what kind of Europe we need. Now we have an economic space that works quite well with the single market, and after many sacrifices, the euro has happily adapted in recent years to the diverse economic reality of countries, although some are still burdened with debts. The main key is to reintroduce political content into the economy. Let me explain. No bank in the world enjoys the freedom and autonomy of the ECB. The U.S. Federal Reserve has Congress as a control system, and the major central banks of Japan and of course, China, are subject to political bodies. The European Parliament, the only one in the world with such limited legislative capacity, must be empowered to propose economic laws and control the ECB to restrict its policies, which primarily serve the interests of large multinational companies and seek to expand the European trade system at any cost. If the Parliament takes control, it could build, alongside this flourishing economic system we have, an economically social system. Additionally, this would mean developing citizen participation democracy through their representatives.
Q. You talk about old demands, such as unifying fiscal and economic policies in all Member States, but also defense and foreign policy. However, it is the national governments themselves that are reluctant to relinquish this autonomy. How can this stance be changed?
A. That is the original flaw. The founders of what would become the European Union already considered this in 1953, but they knew that after World War II, a political union was impossible. However, the 1957 Treaty of Rome already laid the groundwork for it. However, over the years, no agreement has been reached. It came close in the 80s, but there was no consensus on whether Europe should be federal or intergovernmental, and what we have now is economic federalism and a kind of political confederalism. In his speech in Prague in 2023, Scholz raised this issue, speaking of generalizing a qualified majority to make these decisions, but it is complex due to significant differences. How can France, a country with atomic bombs, leave Defense decisions in the hands of Malta, for example? Look at what happened with the genocide in Gaza. The European Union could not agree on a common decision.
Q. Especially in a world where Donald Trump governs, where Ukraine is being invaded, and where China's power is a threat, can Europe afford to have fragmented international relations and not be a united bloc?
A. The obvious answer is no, but we come back to the same point: China, the United States, and Russia are nation-states, while we are 27 countries often in disagreement. We need to consider these differences and build a sui generis set, that is, specific, which includes elements of economic and political federalism when necessary and elements of political confederalism to unite nations. Q. It is the only solution. There is no other possibility. Those who want to live in dreams can continue, but reality is always tragic and dramatic, and it will run us over. But beyond political will, there is a need, as emphasized in your essay, to create a European identity that surpasses those national identities with very different, even turbulent histories among them. How can we progress towards a post-national identity, making people truly feel Europe as a whole?
We have the example, as almost always, in history. National identities can be built when there is public opinion adherence to the global project. Without common interests that can create a shared belonging, we cannot achieve that European political identity. Today, there is not a single book that can speak of our common history without dividing it by countries because each one disagrees with the other on the interpretation of history. Look, for example, at the euro. After arduous debates, its creators could not agree on whether to feature Cervantes or Goethe on the bills. Because others then said it should be Molière or Victor Hugo. That is why we need to find the political tools that can facilitate that transition and, above all, find the social means to ensure that all Europeans have the same social interests, essential for building a common political identity. Unfortunately, there is no European intellectualism today that can address these issues. There were some great intellectuals - I think, for example, of Jürgen Habermas - who have raised this issue. But who listens to Habermas today? We need to develop a European public opinion, promote the construction of a cultural Europe, further develop relationships between populations, relationships at the education and research levels. And we will get there one day. I am convinced that one day we will reach a European nation. But we need to create the tools to get there.
Q. However, one cannot help but think that if this was already difficult when you were a Member of the European Parliament about 25 years ago, when Greco-Latin culture and Christian religion were unquestionable pillars, today Europe is much more diverse in terms of religion, ethnicity, and culture. How to face these not so new challenges?
A. That is a key issue, yes, because diversity will only increase. It is very important to understand that diversity comes from our decision to be more tolerant, from the development of democracy itself. In democracy, there are increasingly more groups and individuals demanding recognition of their cultural specificity and any type of singularity. And it is societies that promote this. Who would have thought that a country like Spain would approve a pioneering law recognizing the rights of homosexuals in the 2000s. This happened because Spain democratized much faster than other places in Europe and, although Spaniards may not believe it, it is probably the most democratic country on the continent, with fewer prejudices. There, you have accepted the consequences of democratization. You cannot live in a democracy and reject the consequences of democracy, as populist extremists pretend.
Q. In this sense, you strongly criticize the recent EU migration policies, a topic you know well and already addressed in your book 'Refugees' (2016).
A. Europe is not a united continent in terms of religion, ethnicity, or culture. Diversity is a reality, and we have to accept it. We cannot expel millions of people who have the nationality of host countries because they are black, Arab, Roma, or whatever. It is impossible to do so if we want to defend the Rule of Law. It is better to adapt the Rule of Law to this reality and work on our diversity, taking into account the problems, the identity issues of each country, that is what is needed, a broad vision. We need a deep reflection on what the European continent is and what it should be. What is unacceptable is that our migration policy is purely police-oriented. Why did only the Interior Ministers attend the famous meeting a few months ago and not the Foreign or Social Affairs Ministers?Europe should not reduce this issue, as Ms. Meloni now wants, to the construction of internment camps, not to mention concentration camps, in countries like Albania, Turkey, Tunisia, or Egypt. Especially because the migratory flow will not stop, and we do not know how it will develop.
Q. Returning to geopolitics, you argue that Europe must redirect its relations with regions that are being greatly neglected, particularly the Mediterranean. Why is this so important?
A. Today, the Mediterranean has become the most important fracture zone in the world, and these tensions could one day lead to another world war. Instead of facing the process of building a developed, integrated, or associated southern basin with European market countries, the European Union has preferred to expand towards the East and completely forget the Mediterranean, portraying it as a zone of threat, of danger. People do not want to leave their countries. If people migrate, it is because economic inequalities are so significant that it is a natural consequence. Europe should focus on building a highly developed sub-Saharan continent with an efficient market. It needs to invest in these countries to have a secure southern flank. It cannot repeat the mistake it made with Russia after the fall of the USSR, to which it failed to propose a satisfactory agreement, leading us to the bloody war in Ukraine.
Q. Another aspect you are very critical of in the current European plan is the enlargement that the Union intends to undertake. Why is this a mistake?
A. In the current conditions, taking a pause is imperative. We should not continue with enlargement because we cannot let everyone in. We should not go up to 36 countries because each country that enters requires funding, which costs the rest of Europeans, and it costs a lot. First and foremost, we need to solve the issues of the 27 countries that are currently together. We need a discussion, a political dialogue among these countries to see what kind of political organization can be adopted, and until that is resolved, we cannot continue to grow. Two years ago, the French proposed, after Macron's speech in 2023 responding to Scholz, the construction of a European political Assembly to address these issues. This Assembly exists, it meets every year. We will see where it leads us, but it is a point of hope.
Q. Now that you mention hope, the prologue closes with a reference to the discussed 'Draghi Report', which highlights many points from your book and seems that, when implemented, will favor many of these changes. Are you optimistic about the future of the EU?
A. Again, looking at history, Europe is a miracle that we have to defend. It is a jewel that we have to protect. But we are in a new phase and we have to get the tools to give it identity. We must avoid nationalist closed-minded thinking, the politicking of States where each one defends its own, and have a common vision in the medium and long term. Not as long as Keynes said that in the long run, we are all dead, but with enough vision to think that what cannot be done now will be done in the coming years. The first steps are as mentioned: BCE statutes that consider member countries and their citizens, common fiscal and industrial policies, policies supporting research and technological development, which are key elements to compete in the era of artificial intelligence, a serious and real cooperation policy in Defense... The cards are on the table, and when reality prevails, decisions must be made. And I, personally, trust the new generations to build the Europe we need.