The chronicle of what happened on October 29 when the DANA devastated Valencia continues to be built on contradictions. President Carlos Mazón presented his version at the Valencian Courts, and other government agencies present at the Integrated Operational Coordination Center (CECOPI) responded, prompting the Consell chief to reply once again. The only point of agreement between the accounts is the concern that existed about the possible dam failure at Forata and that the population was not alerted until 20:11 on that Tuesday.
The Generalitat established the CECOPI at 5:00 p.m. under the direction of the Emergency Councilor, Salomé Pradas. Sources from the Ministry of Ecological Transition (MITECO) denounce that this body was inactive between 6:00 and 7:00 p.m. that afternoon, at a critical moment when the mud from the Poyo ravine was already reaching the towns of L'Horta Sud, and the warnings about the critical situation of the overflowing reservoir were on the table, discussed by all CECOPI members, gathered both in person and online, at 5:26 p.m.
An Emergency 2 scenario was then established in the face of the possible dam failure, and evacuation was also considered, but no decision was made between 5:00 and 6:00 p.m. in the afternoon. President Mazón had not joined yet - although he has always claimed he was "promptly informed" - and it was Councilor Pradas who was in charge. According to the president's words in the Courts, "around 7:45 p.m., at the CECOPI, the Confederation informs that the situation in Forata may worsen." And it is then when the possibility of using Es-Alert is considered "for this reason and no other."
Ministry sources warn that this risk of breakage alert was issued two hours earlier, when the president was not yet at the Emergency Coordination Center. In fact, at 7:12 p.m., when the CECOPI resumes after the inactive hour, is when the mass alert begins to be considered, and it is debated whether the message should be about confinement, moving to higher floors, or prohibiting circulation. It is at 8:11 p.m. when two messages are sent: one specific for municipalities downstream of the reservoir and another for the province of Valencia due to the ravine floods.
In response to this information provided by MITECO sources, the Generalitat accused as false the claim that the dam break risk was warned at 5:26 p.m. "The definite and real intention of declaring Scenario 3 [the break] was around 7:30 p.m." and was confirmed at 8:00 p.m. "with the call from the Secretary of State for the Environment, Hugo Morán," the statement indicates, once again pointing to the Júcar Hydrographic Confederation (CHJ). These government sources had mentioned the risk of breakage communication, Scenario 2, at 5:26 p.m., but not the definitive collapse, something that started to be considered at 7:00 p.m., causing Mazón to go to the Coordination Center around 7:30 p.m.
Following the statement, which does not explain why the CECOPI was inactive between 6:00 and 7:00 p.m., President Mazón himself shifted the government's arguments that pointed to the responsibility of his government. He accused the government of doing "absolutely nothing for three hours" if they knew the risk.
"We have two options: either their argument is false, or the government knew since 5:30 p.m. that the dam could break without doing absolutely anything to alert the population when they had the capacity to do so," reproached Mazón, insisting that as a CECOPI member, under the direction of Councilor Pradas, they had executive decision-making power.